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ABSTRACT. This paper begins by summarizing and 
distilling MacIntyre’s sweeping critique of modern busi­
ness. It identifies the crux of MacIntyre’s critique as 
centering on the fundamental Aristotelian concepts of 
internal goods and practices. MacIntyre essentially follows 
Aristotle in arguing that by privileging external goods 
over internal goods, business activity – and certainly 
modern capitalistic business activity – corrupts practices. 
Thus, from the perspective of virtue ethics, business is 
morally indefensible. The paper continues with an eval­
uation of MacIntyre’s arguments. The conclusion is 
drawn that MacIntyre’s critique, although partially valid, 
does not vitiate modern business as he claims. In short, 
modern business need not of necessity be antithetical to 
individuals’ pursuit of internal goods within practices. 
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Introduction 
As one of the most inﬂuential and controversial 
living philosophers, Alasdair MacIntyre is most well 
known for his book After Virtue, in which he pro­
vides a sweeping and historically based critique of 
modernity. His other works, of which there are 
many, are less well known. This is particularly true 
among business ethicists who, based on After Virtue, 
tend to dismiss MacIntyre as simply ‘anti-business’. 
Other business ethicists attempt to usefully apply 
certain tenets of MacIntyre’s work while avoiding 
his broad critique of business. However, what is 
lacking in the business ethics literature is any eval­
uative critique of MacIntyre’s views on business in 
totem. 
My purpose here is to undertake just such an 
evaluation. Although After Virtue is one source here, 
I also draw on many less-known contributions 
to MacIntyre’s oeuvre. These latter writings, in 
which MacIntyre addresses speciﬁcally his views on 
business, provide a much richer and more nuanced 
picture of MacIntyre’s ‘anti-business’ stance than can 
be gleaned simply from After Virtue. What I hope to 
show below is that MacIntyre can be more accu­
rately characterized as a critic of a certain type of 
business, rather than as a critic of business per se. In 
addition, MacIntyre is not just a critic. He also 
provides a lucid alternative vision of business activ­
ity. His alternative vision is undoubtedly radical in 
that it essentially rejects capitalism, but it is a uniﬁed 
alternative vision nonetheless. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol­
lows. First, I summarize MacIntyre’s central Aristo­
telian thesis. Second, I critique his nuanced critique 
of modern business. Finally, I summarize and eval­
uate his radically alternative ‘anti-capitalist’ vision of 
business activity. 
MacIntyre’s Aristotelian vision of business 
What exactly, according to MacIntyre, precludes 
individuals within a corporation from exercising the 
virtues? Why can we not have a virtuous corpora­
tion? What is it about virtue ethics that excludes 
competitive economic activity from the moral 
realm? MacIntyre, following in the tradition of 
Aristotle and Aquinas, answers these questions in 
depth. He concludes that ‘‘… the tradition of the 
virtues is at variance with central features of 
the modern economic order …’’ (1984, p. 254). In 
the remainder of this section I endeavor to distill the 
essence of his argument, an argument that rests on 
two key concepts, namely that of a practice and of an 
internal good. 
For an individual to successfully cultivate the 
virtues requires that that individual be engaged in 
a type of cooperative activity known – in virtue-
ethics parlance – as a practice. Thus a necessary con­
dition for a business person to be virtuous is that 
communal business activity qualiﬁes as a type of 
practice. But does it? MacIntyre deﬁnes a practice as: 
any coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity through which goods 
internal to that form of activity are realized in the 
course of trying to achieve those standards of excel­
lence which are appropriate to, and partially deﬁnitive 
of, that form of activity, with the result that human 
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions 
of the ends and goods involved, are systematically 
extended. (1984, p. 187) 
In a similar vein Barry Schwartz (1990) isolates 
three central features of practices: 
1. They establish their own standards of excel­
lence, and indeed, are partly deﬁned by those 
standards. 
2. They	 are teleological, that is, goal directed. 
Each practice establishes a set of ‘‘goods’’ or 
ends that is internal or speciﬁc to it, and 
inextricably connected to engaging in the 
practice itself. In other words, to be engaging 
in the practice is to be pursuing these inter­
nal goods. 
3. They are organic. In the course of engaging 
in the practice, people change it, systemati­
cally extending both their own powers to 
achieve its goods, and their conception of 
what its goods are. 
From these deﬁnitions it is clear that the concept 
of an internal good is crucial to the notion of a 
practice. But what exactly is an internal good that 
distinguishes it from an external good? Here Mac-
Intyre builds directly from Aristotle. In the Nico­
machean Ethics, Aristotle begins with the fundamental 
observation that all human activity aims ultimately to 
achieve some perceived good: ‘‘Every art and every 
enquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is 
thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the 
good has rightly been declared to be that at which all 
things aim’’ (1094a19). Aristotle splits goods into 
internal and external. External goods are akin to 
the conventional goods of economics, symbol­
ized by material wealth and what it can provide: 
security, honor, prestige, and power. MacIntyre 
deﬁnes external goods as ‘‘always some individual’s 
property or possession. Moreover characteristically 
they are such that the more someone has of them, 
the less there is for other people. … External goods 
are therefore characteristically objects of competition 
in which there must be losers as well as winners’’. 
(1984, pp. 190–191) 
Internal goods, in contrast, are characterized by 
their physical intangibility. They are intrinsic satis­
factions derived from some activity, and are often 
related to the satisfactions derived from productive 
crafts. Klein, for example, notes, ‘‘[t]he ideal of 
craftsmanship is to create that which has quality or 
excellence; personal satisfaction, pride in accom­
plishment, and a sense of dignity derived from the 
consequent self-development are the motivations’’ 
(1988, p. 55). Following the craft analogy, MacIn­
tyre emphasizes the communal nature of internal 
goods: ‘‘The aim internal to such productive crafts, 
when they are in good order, is never only to catch 
ﬁsh, or to produce beef or milk, or to build houses. 
It is to do so in a manner consonant with the 
excellences of the craft, so that not only is there a 
good product, but the craftsperson is perfected 
through and in her or his activity’’ (1994, p. 284). 
Chytry draws the distinction between the craftwork 
and the commodity: ‘‘what immediately distin­
guishes the craftwork from the commodity is the 
former’s imbeddedness not so much in proﬁt or 
value-creation motivations as in what used to be 
celebrated as a ‘calling’ (Beruf) or vocation’’ (Chytry, 
2007, p. 42). 
This notion of a calling or vocation recognizes the 
moral dimension of internal goods. A dimension 
emphasized in Kekes’s general deﬁnition of internal 
goods as ‘‘satisfactions involved in being and acting 
according to our conceptions of good lives. … 
internal goods are satisfactions involved in the suc­
cessful exercise of some of our dispositions in the 
context of a way of life to which we have committed 
ourselves’’ (1988, p. 656). In a similar vein, Mac-
Intyre relates internal goods to the concept of a 
practice: ‘‘Internal goods are indeed the outcome of 
competition to excel, but it is characteristic of them 
that their achievement is a good for the whole 
community who participate in the practice’’ (1984, 
pp. 190–191). 
Thus, in summary, internal goods possess three 
distinct features: 
1. They are unique to a particular activity. For 
example, in the context of chess, MacIntyre 
talks of ‘‘those goods speciﬁc to chess, … the 
achievement of a certain highly particular kind 
of analytical skill, strategic imagination and 
competitive intensity …’’ (1984, p. 188). Thus 
the internal goods to be derived from chess are 
different from those to be derived from 
accountancy, from badminton, or from archi­
tecture. Fame, power, and money, therefore – 
given their ubiquitous nature – are clearly not 
internal goods. 
2. They	 are not of ﬁnite supply. Thus my 
achievement of any given internal good in 
no way inhibits your achievement of similar 
goods. 
3. They are intangible in the sense that they do 
not readily lend themselves to quantiﬁcation 
or enumeration. This may explain why they 
have been largely ignored by traditional eco­
nomic theory.1 
As MacIntyre argues in After Virtue, it is a cor­
poration’s focus on external goods – on the goods of 
effectiveness over and above the goods of excellence 
– that disqualiﬁes it as a practice. A virtuous corpo­
ration could not have an ultimate goal of economic 
gain: ‘‘It is of the character of a virtue that in order 
that it be effective in producing the internal goods 
which are the rewards of the virtues it should be 
exercised without regard to consequences’’ (Mac-
Intyre, 1984, p. 198). 
Some business ethicists note that the corporation 
is a type of community, and they surmise from this 
that it is an environment suitable for virtue ethics. 
For example Solomon states that ‘‘[c]orporations are 
real communities, neither ideal nor idealized, and 
therefore the perfect place to start understanding the 
nature of the virtues’’ (Solomon, 1992, p. 325). 
What, according to MacIntyre, this view fails to 
recognize is that the very nature of competitive 
economic activity requires a primary focus on 
external goods in order to survive. This focus will 
exclude the virtues. As MacIntyre admits, ‘‘posses­
sion of the virtues may perfectly well hinder us in 
achieving external goods … [w]e should therefore 
expect that, if in a particular society the pursuit of 
external goods were to become dominant, the 
concept of the virtues might suffer at ﬁrst attrition 
and then perhaps something near total effacement’’ 
(1984, p. 196). 
Thus it is not just that the virtues are incompat­
ible with capitalistic business, but also that such 
business actually tends to drive out the virtues. To 
illustrate this, MacIntyre depicts a ‘modern’ ﬁshing 
community: 
A ﬁshing crew may be organized as a purely technical 
and economic means to a productive end, whose aim 
is only or overridingly to satisfy as proﬁtably as possible 
some market’s demand for ﬁsh. Just as those managing 
its organization aim at a high level of proﬁts, so also the 
individual crew members aim at a high level of reward. 
… When however the level of reward is insufﬁciently 
high, then the individual whose motivations and val­
ues are of this kind will have from her or his own point 
of view the best of reasons for leaving this particular 
crew or even taking to another trade. … [M]anage­
ment will from its point of view have no good reason 
not to ﬁre crew members, and owners will have no 
good reason not to invest their money elsewhere. 
(1994, p. 285) 
Here MacIntyre is describing contemporary 
business. The above is clearly an organization 
pursuing external goods in a competitive market 
economy. This is not a virtuous ﬁshing crew. Spe­
ciﬁcally, MacIntyre isolates three ‘‘central features of 
the modern economic order’’ that exclude it from 
the virtues. These are ‘‘individualism … acquisi­
tiveness and its elevation of the values of the market 
to a central social place’’ (1984, p.254). As a con­
sequence, the actors within modern ﬁrms, namely 
managers, compartmentalize themselves within the 
conﬁnes of a morally stunted version of utilitarian­
ism, namely cost-beneﬁt analysis. The milieu of the 
modern ﬁrm renders them blind to considerations 
beyond the ﬁnancial ‘bottom line.’ 
For example, in Utilitarianism and Cost-Beneﬁt 
Analysis, MacIntyre observes that ‘‘once the execu­
tive is at work the aims of the public or private 
corporation must be taken as given. Within the 
boundaries imposed by corporate goals and legal 
constraints the executive’s own tasks characteristi­
cally appear to him as merely technical … [the] 
moral considerations underlying cost-beneﬁt analysis 
are simply suppressed’’ (1977, pp. 218 and 237). 
Similarly, in Social Structures and their Threats to Moral 
Agency, MacIntyre discusses ‘‘a business corporation 
whose chief executive ofﬁcer decides to exaggerate 
the progress made by the corporation’s scientists on a 
research project, with the aims both of not losing 
customers to rivals and of bolstering share prices’’ 
(1999b, p. 322). MacIntyre argues that the ‘‘only 
grounds on which objection to such deception can 
be based, if it is to be heard, is that in the longer run 
deception will fail to maximize corporate proﬁts’’ 
(p. 323). 
Similarly, in After Virtue, in listing managers – 
along with therapists and aesthetes – as one of the 
principal ‘characters’ of modernity, MacIntyre argues 
that managers ‘‘conceive of themselves as morally 
neutral characters whose skills enable them to devise 
the most efﬁcient means of achieving whatever end 
is proposed. Whether a given manager is effective or 
not is on the dominant view a quite different 
question from that of the morality of the ends which 
his effectiveness serves or fails to serve’’ (1984, 
p. 74). And ﬁnally, in Why are the Problems of Business 
Ethics Insoluble?, MacIntyre returns solidly to the 
theme of compartmentalization: ‘‘With one part of 
the self one is a corporate executive understanding 
every project in terms of a suitably narrow con­
ception of cost-beneﬁt analysis and ignoring large 
side effects of one’s activity. … Effectiveness in 
organizations is often both the product and the 
producer of an intense focus on a narrow range of 
specialized tasks which has as its counterpart a 
blindness to other aspects of one’s activity’’ (1982, 
pp. 357–358). 
Another related criticism that MacIntyre levels 
against the modern ﬁrm is that of myopia: ‘‘The 
failure to be responsible for the future is not just a 
product of the negligence of individuals, but is 
rooted in the forms and tendencies of organizational 
and corporate life’’ (1982, p. 357). He connects this 
to the narrow focus on cost-beneﬁt analysis, which 
he believes forces managers to set arbitrary, and likely 
short-term, horizons; ‘‘in a private proﬁt-seeking 
corporation the current rates of return expected on 
investment will place constraints on such a choice of 
dates …’’ (1977, p. 232). This is further reﬂected in 
his depiction of the modern ﬁshing crew above: the 
managers readily ‘‘invest their money elsewhere’’ 
when the ﬁsh stocks decline. 
More broadly, in Corporate Modernity and Moral 
Judgment: Are They Mutually Exclusive?, MacIntyre 
lists ‘‘four ways the moral structure of the modern 
corporate world can be deﬁned by negation – by the 
striking absence of honor, of blasphemy, of cere­
monial death, and of the story-telling elders’’ (1979, 
p. 134). Corporate modernity, according to 
MacIntyre, lacks a sense of ‘‘cosmic order’’ (ibid., 
p. 133) in which communal narrative, communal 
recognition of birth and death, communal belief in 
the divine, and a communal sense of honor and 
insult can all play signiﬁcant roles. And more 
recently MacIntyre has continued this criticism by 
asserting, in Dependant Rational Animals, that market-
based relationships such as those within and between 
modern ﬁrms ‘‘undermine and corrupt communal 
ties’’ (1999a, b, p. 117). 
Evaluating MacIntyre’s Aristotelian 
business ethics 
Is MacIntyre correct? Does the modern ﬁrm within 
capitalism induce compartmentalization and myo­
pia? Do the managers of modern ﬁrms frame every 
decision in terms of a narrowly deﬁned cost-beneﬁt 
analysis? Do they leave moral agency at the door 
when they enter the boardroom? 
Although the picture MacIntyre paints of modern 
business undoubtedly illustrates many of the char­
acteristics of contemporary corporate culture, he 
paints with very broad brush-strokes. Modern ﬁrms 
and the managers therein undoubtedly exhibit the 
shortcomings that MacIntyre highlights. But the 
evidence indicates that these ﬁrms and individuals 
exhibit the shortcomings to a greater or lesser 
degree. Also, these enterprises exhibit other, more 
morally desirable, characteristics that are not con­
sistent with MacIntyre’s characterization. In short, 
for reasons summarized below, MacIntyre’s view 
may be too narrow. 
First, many managers do in fact devote non-
superﬁcial moral reﬂection to their role as managers. 
This is evidenced by the many ongoing ethics lec­
ture-series held at many business schools in which 
managers typically discuss their on-the-job moral 
deliberations. These belie Macintyre’s claim that 
‘‘there is no milieu available to them [managers] in 
which they are able, together with others, to step 
back from those roles and those requirements and to 
scrutinize themselves and the structure of their 
society from some external standpoint with any 
practical effect’’ (1999b, p. 322). 
It is not even necessary to look at the business-
ethics evidence. If we restrict ourselves to the 
observations of writers who have no explicit concern 
with ethics, we still ﬁnd compelling evidence that 
MacIntyre’s rendition of the modern ﬁrm – and the 
compartmentalized manager therein – is too narrow. 
In The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Perfor­
mance and Growth, John Roberts begins with the 
statement: ‘‘The most fundamental responsibilities of 
general managers are setting strategy and designing 
the organization to implement it’’ (2004, p. ix). He 
goes on to state that ‘‘Firms are institutions created 
to serve human needs … to provide meaningful 
experiences’’ (p. 18). He recognizes that this cannot 
be achieved by applying only explicit criteria (such as 
cost-beneﬁt analysis), evaluative criteria such as 
corporate culture are equally important: ‘‘Culture is 
the ‘softer’ stuff, but it is not less important for that. 
It involves the fundamental shared values of the 
people in the ﬁrm, as well as their shared beliefs 
about why the ﬁrm exists, about what they are 
collectively and individually doing, and to what 
end’’ (p. 18). Note well that, in contradiction to 
MacIntyre’s assertion, Roberts observes that man­
agers do not take ends as given. It is also noteworthy 
that Roberts bases his observations on experiences 
gained from ‘‘the executives and managers at the 
many companies I have been able to visit and study, 
especially BP, General Motors, Johnson Controls, 
Nokia, Novo Nordisk, Sony, and Toyota’’ (p. xi). 
For example, in the case of Nokia: ‘‘People were 
simply expected to do their best and were trusted to 
act in the best interests of the company … 
employees throughout the ﬁrm were motivated by 
the desire to save the company. The successes they 
collectively achieved were a source of real pride.’’ 
(pp. 174 and 276). 
This description is strikingly similar to MacIntyre’s 
prescription that the ‘‘aim internal to such productive 
crafts, when they are in good order, is never only to 
catch ﬁsh, or to produce beef or milk, or to build 
houses. It is to do so in a manner consonant with the 
excellences of the craft, so that not only is there a 
good product, but the craftsperson is perfected 
through and in her or his activity’’ (1994, p. 284). 
So, in a book that never even mentions ethics, 
Roberts observes the modern ﬁrm creating and 
nurturing what MacIntyre argues it is quintessentially 
incapable of creating and nurturing: namely practices. 
Roberts’s experiences reveal a management psy­
chology far deeper and more nuanced than merely a 
rigid application of cost-beneﬁt analysis as MacIntyre 
suggests. Indeed, Roberts concludes his book by 
observing that ‘‘solving the problems of strategy and 
organization is an act of real creativity’’ (p. 286). 
As with Roberts, Michael Jensen resides ﬁrmly in 
the camp of a ﬁnancial-economic perspective on the 
ﬁrm. But, on the few occasions when Jensen does 
venture into a broad discussion of the nature and 
purpose of business, we again ﬁnd prescriptions 
strikingly similar to MacIntyre’s utopian practice-
nurturing institution: ‘‘Value maximization is not a 
vision or a strategy or even a purpose; … people … 
must be turned on by the vision or the strategy in the 
sense that it taps into some human desire or passion 
of their own – for example, a desire to build the 
worlds best automobile or to create a ﬁlm or play 
that will move people for centuries’’ (2001, p. 16). 
So here we see Jensen, albeit inadvertently, making a 
distinction that can readily be seen as analogous to 
that of internal and external goods; and note well 
that for Jensen the internal goods are the motivator 
and the external goods the way of ‘keeping score.’ 
He continues: 
Value seeking tells an organization and its par­
ticipants how their success in achieving a vision or in 
implementing a strategy will be assessed. But value 
maximizing or value seeking says nothing about how 
to create a superior vision or strategy. Nor does it tell 
employees or managers how to ﬁnd or establish 
initiatives or ventures that create value. … Deﬁning 
what it means to score a goal in football or soccer, 
for example, tells the players nothing about how to 
win the game. [Ibid] 
Jensen’s soccer example invites parallels to Mac­
Intyre’s discussion of the internal goods of chess: 
‘‘those goods speciﬁc to chess, in the achievement of a 
certain highly particular kind of analytical skill, stra­
tegic imagination and competitive intensity’’ (1984, 
p. 187). (And note well in passing that MacIntyre 
views ‘competitive intensity’ – a foundational prin­
ciple of capitalism – as an internal good.) 
Finally from Jensen: ‘‘we must give employees 
and managers a structure that will help them resist 
the temptation to maximize short-term ﬁnancial 
performance … short-term proﬁt maximization at 
the expense of long-term value creation is a sure way 
to destroy value’’ (op cit). This belies MacIntyre’s 
claim that capitalism necessarily promotes myopia. 
As Hart observes, ‘‘the ﬁrm must not only perform 
efﬁciently in today’s businesses, but it should also be 
constantly mindful of generating the products and 
services of the future. This means developing or 
acquiring the skills, competencies, and technologies 
that reposition the ﬁrm for future growth. … A 
convincing articulation of how and where the ﬁrm 
plans to grow in the future is crucial to the gener­
ation of shareholder value’’ (2007, pp. 63–64). So 
whether involved in ﬁshing, farming, computer 
software development, or all three, the modern 
ﬁrm’s outlook is far from arbitrary or myopic. 
Indeed, archeological evidence indicates that – at 
least in the context of natural resource depletion – 
pre-modern communities were the real sufferers 
from myopia: ‘‘American Indians often so pressured 
or depleted basic resources like land and trees that 
they had to switch from one type of food to another 
or move the locations of their villages’’ (Krech, 
1999, p. 76); similarly, the indigenous pre-modern 
culture of Easter Island collapsed when all the trees 
on the island were felled (ibid.). 
Conclusion 
Returning to MacIntyre’s depiction of ﬁshing crews, 
in contrast to the modern ﬁshing enterprise 
described above, MacIntyre conjures another ‘Aris­
totelian’ ﬁshing community: 
Consider by contrast a crew whose members may well 
have initially joined for the sake of their wage or other 
share of the catch, but who have acquired from the rest 
of the crew an understanding of and devotion to 
excellence in ﬁshing and to excellence in playing one’s 
part as a member of such a crew. … So the interde­
pendence of the members of a ﬁshing crew in respect 
of skills, the achievement of goods and the acquisition 
of virtues will extend to an interdependence of the 
families of crew members and perhaps beyond them to 
the whole society of a ﬁshing village. (1994, p. 285) 
Where might such communities actually exist, or 
have existed? MacIntyre gives several examples: 
Fishing communities in New England, Welsh min­
ing communities, farming coops in Donegal, Mayan 
towns in Guatemala and Mexico, ancient Greek city 
states, Greek highland villages, medieval Christian 
and Arab kingdoms, Scottish highland clans before 
1600, the Sioux nation, Bedouin of the Western 
desert, and the Irish of the Blasket Islands? (1982, 
and 1999a). 
But these examples reﬂect again the ‘broad-brush’ 
characteristic of MacIntyre’s vision. Although the 
above communities undoubtedly possess or pos­
sessed desirable attributes, they also undoubtedly 
possessed many undesirable attributes. A focus on 
internal goods, in and of itself, is not sufﬁcient to 
render a community utopian, or even desirable. 
Many members of these communities, particularly 
those not in the power elite, were no doubt happy to 
leave them behind and embrace capitalist modernity. 
As Frazer and Lacey note: ‘‘Feminist theory under­
stands male power exercised and maintained in and 
through practices’’ (1994, p. 271). 
In Dependant Rational Animals, MacIntyre argues 
that utopia would be ‘‘inimical to and in conﬂict 
with the goals of a consumer society’’ (1999a, 
p. 145). But as Keat recently pointed out, ‘‘although 
the acquisition of consumer ‘goods’ takes place 
through exchange within the market (or economic) 
domain, the realization of their value typically takes 
place in non-market domains’’ (2007, p. 6, his 
emphasis). For example, if I wish to pursue the 
internal goods of chess, the market will not prevent 
me from whittling my own chess pieces from a piece 
of walnut if I so choose; but what it will do is present 
me with a dizzying array of alternative chess sets; not 
to mention some very sophisticated non-human 
opponents. But note well the choice to participate in 
the ‘consumer society’ is mine. 
MacIntyre describes utopia in terms of ‘‘rejecting 
the economic goals of advanced capitalism’’ (1999a, 
p. 145). But his logic rests on the premise that 
these economic goals corrupt other non-economic 
goals – the types of goals people had in pre-
modernity. But the evidence does not support this 
premise; in fact it indicates the opposite. There is 
now available a wealth of evidence to indicate that it 
is precisely advanced capitalism in general and the 
modern ﬁrm in particular that has engendered 
human ﬂourishing. This evidence indicates a high 
correlation between health, wealth, and happiness 
1 
for all demographic groups (Baumol et al., 2007; 
Hart, 2007; Layard, 2005). And this includes the 
elderly and disabled; the latter being groups 
MacIntyre is particularly concerned about in 
Dependant Rational Animals. Also, in The Moral 
Consequences of Economic Growth (2005), Friedman 
provides solid evidence to indicate that one essential 
ingredient for communal moral health and happiness 
is economic growth. 
This is not to say that the modern ﬁrm, embraced 
by capitalism, is perfect in the sense of always nur­
turing internal goods within practices. But it at least 
has provided unparalleled material wealth as a 
foundation for practices. Capitalism is also ﬂexible 
and continually evolving. MacIntyre’s critique might 
be better used as a source of direction for this evo­
lutionary process, rather than – as MacIntyre himself 
tends to use it – as a ‘call-to-arms’ for capitalism’s 
destruction. 
Note 
Recently, however, even economists are more read­
ily recognizing notions of internal or intrinsic motiva­
tion and satisfaction: Kreps, for example, challenges 
economists’ conventionally -assumed inverse relation 
between effort and utility when he suggests that 
‘‘[w]orkers may take sufﬁcient pride in their work so 
that effort up to some level increases utility’’ (1997, 
p. 361). He acknowledges that this calls into question 
conventional notions of motivation: ‘‘Answers involve 
looking into the utility functions of individuals, terra 
incognito for standard microeconomics’’ (p. 361). Sen, 
who does venture into this terra incognito, warns of the 
dangers ‘‘imposed by taking an overly narrow view of 
human motivation’’ (1997, p. 750f). 
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